1.

Absolute (ideally) "predicativity" of inner speech, when its 'logical subject', object of attention (i.e. what I am thinking about and speaking to myself) is not articulated, but implied, eluding and vanishing in silence as otherness [a clumsy English term for Hegel's 'Anderssein', literally meaning "alter being" like "alter ego" - editor's note] of thought... "The rest is silence." (Hamlet) Inner speech is the silence of the principal, of that what is the subject of thought. That is why it is thought.
Only when (this "when" is the inner speech) the subject of thought falls out of the thought (speech), appears "on the other side" of thought, "out-side" of it, only then this is the subject of thought, and the thought is the thought...

Further, the absolute (ultimately) predicativity of the inner speech implies also the core change in the very sense of the notion of predicate: the defining of the given (implied) subject involves all relevant - in terms of sense, though not in terms of meaning - predicates, generally, related to other subjects, existing in other syntactic structures: all this continuum of predicates keeps compressing, concentrating, the predicates overlay each other, merging into a single, strangely clumsy, vaguely multi-meaning attribute, which is aimed, by its cone spike, at (silenced) "logic subject", intruding this subject.
It is essential also that in the inner speech (in its deepening movement) predicates do not need physical, phonetic unfolding, they are presented here by flectic parts of words, by their ultimate specificities, forming a phrase-word-sounding comprised into an indivisible instant point, "severable" only by its potential unfolding into outer speech and by its former being (in outer speech).
Thus, there is initial dissociation of the logic subject with itself...